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FOREWORD
3
The Shuttle User Analysis (Study 2.2) Final. Report is comprised	 i
3
of four volumes, which are titled as follows:
Volume I -	 Executive Summary
Volume II -	 User Charge Analysis
Volume III -	 Business 'Risk and Value of Operations In
Space (BRAVO)
Part 1 - Summary
Part 2 - User's Manual
Part 3 - Workbook
Part 4 - Computer Programs and, Data Look-Up
Part 5
	
- Analysis of 'GSFC Earth (Observation
Satellite (EOS) System Mission Model
Using BRAVO Techniques
Volume IV -	 Standardized Subsystem Modules Analysis 	 j
y
1
_	 ;
E
111
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Mr. Frank Cepollina, Space Shuttle Payloads Office, NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center, managed the study, furnished data on
the GSFC standard subsystem module approach, and periodically
reviewed the progress, offering guidance on study emphasis.
The Aerospace Corporation effort on this add - on task for
Study 2. 2 was supported by the following members of the technical
staff:
Earth Observation Mission Equipment and Problem Definition'
T. Shiokari
Launch Vehicle Accommodation Analysis
.^	 s
i
J. A. Plough	 #
Satellite Synthesis
R. T. Blake a
Cost Estimating
H. G. Campbell
D. W. Cochran
System Risk Analysis
J. J., Dawson
r
,
iv	 __- s
1i°
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION	 ................................ 1-1
2. DEFINITION OF TERMS ............................ 2-1
3. SUMMARY	 ..................................... 3-1
4. PROBLEM STATEMENT	 ........................... 4-1
4.1	 Satellite System Objective ..................... 0 4-1
4.2	 Satellite Mission Equipment 	 00'00 .. . . ... .. .... . . . 4-3
4.3	 Satellite Interfaces with Earth Surface 	 . .... ..... .... 4-3
4.4	 Year Required,	 Growth	 ....................... 4-3
4.5	 Preferred Space System Approach	 0000.:. 0000.	 . .. 4-8
4.6	 Competing Terrestrial Systems ... . ......... . .. . . 4-8
4.7	 System Budget.	 ......................... 0 .... 4-8
4.8	 Special Problems	 0 .... .. .... .......... ... . . . 4-51
4.9	 References	 ....... . . . . . . ,.. .. 0040..0. 0 .. ... 4-10 a
5. SATELLITE SYNTHESIS ................... 0 0000.... 5-1
6. SATELLITE ACCOMMODATION .................. 0 .... 6-1
?. SYSTEM COSTING • 	 • .. . . . 0.000. . 0 0 . 0 0 . . . . . . . .. 7-1 
8, RISK AND LOGISTICS ANALYSIS ......... • 0 • • • • • • • • • • • 8-1
9. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND STUDY FINDINGS .. 0 ......... • 9-1
100 ADDITIONAL EFFORT	 ............. ............... 10-1
4
11. REFERENCE	 ........ . ........... ...0...........11 -1
F
v
TABLES
3-1. Comparison of Satellite System Modes of Operation, STS`
Supported, Standardized Satellites with Redundant
Components	 ............... ... .. . ....... .'. . . . 3-2
4-1. EOS Satellites On Orbit Schedule .................... 4-2
4-2. Summary of EOS Satellites Mission Equipments ....... 4-4
4-3. Mission Equipment	 ................. ....... .... . 4-5
4-4. Mission Equipment	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
4-5. Summary of SMM Satellite Mission Equipments 	 .......... 4-7
5-1. EOS-C Design Weight Statement Organized by Module ...... 5-3
5-2. EOS-B Design Weight Statement Organized by Module ..... , 5-5
5-3. Design Weight Statement Organized for Cost Estimating
EOS Spacecraft Build Up from Standard Modules ......... 5-9
5-4. Effects of Standardization on Satellite Weight and Availability
Satellite Design with Redundant Components Operated In An
Orbital Resupply Mode, Typical Result	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10
6-1. EOS Transportation Charges . . . . . .................. 6-2
8-1. Risk/Logistics Analysis Assumptions . . . ........ . . . . . 8-3
9 -10 Comparison of EOS-B Satellite System Modes of Operation
STS Supported, No Satellite Component Redundancy. ... .... 9 -2
9-2. Effects of Standardization on Cost, Satellite Design With
Redundant Components Operating In An Orbital Resupply
Mode,
	
Typical Result . . . . . . . . . 00 6609.... _9060.0... 9-5
9-3. Comparison of Satellite System. Modes of Operation
STS Supported, Standardized Satellites with Redundant
C omponents	 . . . . ...-. . • . . . . . . . 0 . 6 0 0 . .. . 0 . . .. . . . . . ... 9-6
9-4. Cost Comparisons ($M), Space Resupply Mode vs Ground
Refurbish Mode, Standardized Designs, One Level of
Redundancy	 ............... 0 0 0 . .. . . . . .' . . .	 . . . . 9-7
9-5. Comparison of Satellite System Modes of Operation,- STS
Supported, Non-Standard Satellites with Redundant
r
1
FIGURES
9-1. Effect of Satellite Unit Cost on Space Resupply Benefits for
STS Supported EOS-B, Standardized Satellite Design with
Redundant Components	 ... 0000 0000.... 0000.... . . . 9-10
9-2. Effect of Satellite Repair Cost on Space Resupply Benefits
for STS Supported EOS-B, Standardized Satellite Design
gr„ with Redundant Components 	 .............. . ... . . . 9-11
9-3.9-3, Effect of Launch Delay on System Availability, Standardized
Satellites, Redundant Components, Space Resupply Mode of
Operation	 ................................... 9-12
9-4. Effect of Satellite Failure Rate on Space Resupply Benefits
for STS Supported EOS-B	 . 0 .. 0 0 0 .0.000........... 9-13
0000
t
V
B
..
0000
.j
Vil
'.
1. INTRODUCTION
i
ar
i
Under the Business Risk and Value of Operations In Space (BRAVO)
task for Study 2. 2, an analysis was initiated in July of 1974 and completed
the end of August of 1974 which resulted in cost comparisons between
three modes of operation for the Earth Observation System (EOS-B).
This analysis was initiated. at the direction of William F. Moore at NASA
Headquarters for the purpose of comparing results with the Goddard
Space Flight Center (GSFC)-sponsored EOS satellite contractor studies
now in progress. The objective of this brief task was to make a compari-
son with the output of the contractor studies as a check on the validity
of the BRAVO techniques. As this work was in progress, Mr. Frank
Cepollina, GSFC, requested an expansion of the effort to consider
additional cases designed to investigate the best way to operate the
Y
	
	
EOS systems with the Space Shuttle system considering cost analysis
of an entire series of five projects (EOS-B, -C, -D, -E, and Solar
Maximum Mission, SMM). An additional $20K was contracted for this
effort.
This add-on effort ,made use of the July/August 1974 results
but superseded them with chang,ss in satellite requirements, mission
equipment, and population on orbit. This report describes the BRAVO/
EOS add-on analysis.	 3
The objective of the BRAVO/EOS analysis was to furnish data
to NASA on alternative ways to use the Shuttle/EOS, thereby assisting
NASA in selecting the best way to operate the EOS with the Shuttle.
In this study, the space system mission capabilities between systems
to be compared are made equal by utilizing identical mission equipment
i
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iin the same orbits for the systems compared. The space system risk
(or outage) is made as nearly equal as possible between systems being
compared by first, calculating the outage, and then by adjusting it as
necessary. The method used most commonly to adjust outage is to
change the number of spare satellites available for satellite replacement
from the ground. For instance, if a satellite system shows an outage'
too low, the number of spares on the ground may be increased in order
to lower the probability of a failure on orbit with no ground spare or
replacement. With the space system mission capabilities and outage
equal, then the space system costs can be compared one system to
another with the confidence that one is comparing equal systems.
2. DEFINITION OF TERMS
	
1.	 SPACEFRAME
The spaceframe portion of the satellite includes structure
and cabling which supports the satellite modules.
	
2.	 NON-REPLACEABLE UNIT (NRU)
The NRU portion of the satellite includes the spaceframe,
the added flexible solar cell array, and any mission equip-
ment which is not modularized.
	
3.	 SATELLITE MODULES
The satellite modules each generally contain an entire sub-
system or major portion thereof in accordance with GSFC's
module design approach for EOS. A module is designed for
each of the following subsystems:
a. Communications, Data Processing, and Instrumentation	 3
(CDPI)
b. - Guidance, Navigation, Stability and Control (GNS&C)
C .	 Electrical
d. -	 Propulsion (including reaction control propellants)
e. Modularized Mission Equipment
	
4.	 NON-STANDARD
A non-standard module design is sized and developed to meet
the requirements for each specific mission.
2-1
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15. STANDARD
Standard modules indicates that the modules are developed
and applied to as many missions as possible. Under ideal
conditions, one set of modules would be applied to all missions.
6. COST TO ESTABLISH AND OPERATE
The cost to establish and operate includes investment, trans-
portation, launch operations, and satellite refurbishment or
repair costs. It excludes DDT&E costs.
7. AVAILABILITY
Availability is the system up time divided by the up time
plus the down time.
t
8. MODE OF OPERATION
The term mode of operation designates the approach to logistics
supporting a satellite system during the operating period.
The modes considered in this analysis were space resupply
mode, ground refurbishment mode, and expend mode.
d
9. SPACE RESUPPLY MODE
In space resupply, the primary mode for extending the operating
life of a system when a failure is -.encountered, is to replace
the failed module on orbit and return the failed module for
refurbishment and reuse. Worn out or wearing out modules
are also replaced on orbit by adding replacement modules to
the failed modules flights. For a redundant component design,
when a redundant component fails, the module containing the
redundant failed component is replaced by adding modules to
failed module flights. In. addition, the failing modules with
f
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a redundant component out may occasionally add up to a full
load of modules for one flight, in which case they are replaced.
In a space resupply mode it is possible to have a failure in
a non-replaceable; unit, in which case the satellite is replaced
and returned to the ground for refurbishment. At this time
any worn out modules or wearing out modules would also be
replaced.
10. GROUND REFURBISHMENT MODE
For the ground refurbishment mode, the satellite on orbit`
is replaced by the spare satellite on the ground, usually a
refurbished satellite. Six months is allowed for satellite
refurbishment between the time the satellite is returned and
is again ready for flight.
11. EXPEND MODE
For the expend mode, new satellites are used to replace failed
satellites on orbit. It is assumed that the new satellites will
be procured in advance of the need for replacement so that no
procurement delays are encountered.
SUMMARY
The satellite optimized in this analysis considering all five
f	 _	 3
I	 missions (EOS-B, -C, -D, -E,i and SMM) was a design built up from
4	
standard subsystem modules with one level of component redundancy{
f	 designed for four-year life considering -expandable exhaustion and wear- a
out (resulting in approximately28 wionths mean mission duration). The
non-replaceable unit used the same basic spaceframe design for all five
missions with 'special structure and cabling added when the number of 	 a
modules reported exceeded six or when unique structure was needed to
C
support non-modularized mission equipment. As is shown in later sections
of this report, the standardization reduces the DDT&E costs substantially.
For these analyses, it was assumed that the same NASA organization
managed the standardized satellite development, procurement, and
integration using the same contractor setup for each spacecraft develop-
ment and fabrication. The long life reduces logistics costs for all three
modes studied.
The results of the analysis comparing the three logistic modes
(expend, ground refurbish, and space resupply) are summarized in
Table 3-1 for the EOS satellites. The savings for the space resupply
mode of operation over the other two modes of operation are the result
of first a reduction in the number of flights and second a reduction in i
the amount of hardware, either purchased new or refurbished. For EOS-C,
-D, and -E, the number of satellite flights is approximately the same 	 a
for all modes of operation and the cost reduction for ground refurbishment
over the expendable mode is due to the reuse of satellites after refurbishment.
A further reduction in costs for the space resupply mode over the ground
refurbished mode of operation is due to the reduction in the amount of
hardware refurbished. In the space resupply mode, only a portion of the
Satellite	 v Number Cost To Establish &
Satellite Operational System Of Operate Relative To
Project Mode Availability Satellite Launches Expendable Mode
Expend 0.90 9.4 1.00
EOS-°B Ground Refurb. 0.86 9.3 0.76
Space Resupply 0.92 6.6	 _ 0.57
Expend 0.92 5.7 1.00
EOS-C Ground Refurb. 0.90 5.6 0.74
Space Resupply 0.90 6.5 0.65
Expend 0.86 10.7 __	 1.00
EOS -D Ground Refurb. 0.79 10.4 0.71
Space Resupply 0.83 10.8 0.63
Expend 0.88 :10.0 1.00
EOS-E Ground Refurb._ 0.85 99 0.83
Space Resupply 0.84 11.0 0.63
Table 3-1. Comparison of Satellite System Modes of Operation
STS- Supported, Standardized Satellites with Redundant
Components
rt
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4. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The inputs and definition of the problem for the BRAVO/EOS
satellite analysis are based on data furnished by GSFC or extracted from
reference information made available by GSFC. These are the basic
data around which the satellite was designed and operated in order to
fulfill the five missions analyzed.
4.1	 SATELLITE SYSTEM OBJECTIVE
To use in the optimum way the Space Shuttle with EOS satellite
configm:oidons before 1982 the EOS is launched by an expendable launch
vehicle. In 1982 and after, the EOS is launched by and serviced by the
Shuttle. The EOS configuration shall use standard housekeeping sub-
system modules and shall accommodate sensors for earth observation
of land resources, ocean dynamics, and atmospheric conditions.
The tradeoff analysis shall consider Thor/Delta and Titan III expendable
launch vehicles, and the deployment, on- orbit maintenance, and ground	 3
refurbishment modes of Shuttle operation.
The EOS missions to be addressed in this study are scheduled
in Table 4-1. The missions which have an impact on the EOS system are
the EOS-A, -B, -C, -D, and -E series. _ The SEOS, SMM, and EGRET
missions are included for potential sharing of development and unit
costs. The EOS series are all low- altitude and polar-inclined missions,
but have specific equatorial crossing times. The equatorial crossing
times will require the Shuttle to perform orbital inclination change
operations when servicing more than one satellite.
f
t	 _	 _
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Expendable ShuttleLaunch Vehicle
Orbit Equator
Mis sions (nmi x deg) x Time Mission Equipment 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
EROS
EOS-A 385 x 98.2 11:00AM MSS + TM* 1 1
EOS-B 385 x 98.2 11:00AM TM + HRPI + DCS 1 2& 2 2 2© 2 2 2
(2)
Water Res., Poll-
ution'& Commodity -
Prediction
EOS- C 385 x 98.2 9:30AM FTM + HRPI *+ SAR 1 1 1 1 Q 1	 1	 1 1L 1	 1
3:30PM LPOLL. MONT. 4(3)1
Ocean Dynamics
EOS-D 430 x 1080 (1) (ALT -, SCATS= , SAIV, 1	 1 41 2 2. 2© 2 2 2AL 2
LMWR*, VIRR*	 J
Weather & Climate
EOS-E 450 x 98.8 9:OOAM rVTS, AVHRR, DCS] 1 2 2 2 2 2© 2 2 2 QL
.:. J0PM SEMS, CZACS	 J
SEOS (Synch. Geosynch. NA 1.5M Telescope/ 1 1 Q l	 1	 1 Ql	 1	 i
EOS) [Image
Scientific
SMM (Solar 300 x 28 NA Sensors*, 1 i 1 1 1	 1 Ql	 1	 1 i,&i
Max. Mission) ^11Mag. -Spect,JJ
EGRET (Expl. Z50 x 28 NA Spark Chamber* I 1 1
Gamma Expt.
Telescope)
NOTE:
Q Mission Equipment DDT&E for First FlightMission Equipment DDT&E
NA Not Applicable(1) Two Satellites are Phased(2) Two Satellites Phased 180 0 Apart(3) Pollution Monitor Assumed to be Similar to TM
^ F_
The NASA Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF)
interest in sponsoring this effort was to parallel the GSFC contracted
studies on EOS. For OMSF, satellite designs, analysis, cost studies,
and comparisons were made on EOS-A and EOS-B as the contractors
were doing.
GSFC was interested in a more complete analysis and comparison,
involving all EOS missions and, in addition to the BRAVO synthesized
EOS system, operating BRAVO on the contractor-generated design.
	
4.2	 SATELLITE MISSION EQUIPMENT
a. Type: Earth Observations
b. Description: Summarized in Table 4-2 and detailed in Tables
4-3 and 4-4. For completeness, the SMM mission description
is described in Table 4 -5.
	4.3	 SATELLITE_ INTERFACES WITH EARTH SURFACE
a. Low rate telemetry, command, and tracking functions
with existing STDN stations.
b. Wideband communication (200 Mbps) link to Sioux Falls,
South Dakota will provide CONUS coverage (station does
not currently exist).
C.	 Low cost ground stations (20,Mbps) for user direct
access of selected mission equipment data with minimal
ground equipment investment.
	
4.4	 YEAR REQUIRED, GROWTH
a. Initial Operation: 1978
b. Full Operation 1982
C.	 Growth Rate: None
b
r
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MISSION EQUIPMENT WIDE BAND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Data Rate Tape Transmission
Average Weight Raw Recorder Unit
MISSION Point Power kg (Proc)(2) Weight Power Weight
EOS EQUIPMENT") Acc. W (lb) Mbps kg (lb) W kg (lb) Coverage
A MSS + TM 30 Sec 100 215(474) 115 -0- 175 55 (120) CONUS
B TM + HRPI + DCS 30 Sec 124 314(691) 175 -0- 230 73 (160) CONUS
C 2TM + HRPI + SAR 30 Sec 1329(3) 572(1261) 475(4) 182 (400) 300 91 (200) CONUS
D ALT + SCAT + SAR 0.5 Deg 506 360 25 91 (200) 140 36 ( 80) WORLD-MWR ± VIRR (794) (0.350) WIDE
E VTS +AVHRR +DCS 0.2 De g 340 364 (0. 32.3) 45 (100) 120 36 ( 80) WORLD-+ SEMS + CZACS (800) WIDE
(1) For further detail on mission equipment characteristics, see Tables 4-3 and 4-4.
(2) Processed data transmission rate shown in parenthesis; no raw data transmitted when processed data
transmitted.
(3) 1150 Watts operates only during_ daylight hours for 10 minutes/orbit.
(4) 275 Mbps transmitted; 200 Mbps 'stored on tape.
s--
ri
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Table 4-3. Mission Equipment
High
Resolution Synthetic
5-Band Multi- Pointable Aperture
Spect, al Scanner Thematic Mapper Imager Radar
Misjiion Equipment (MSS) (TM) (HR PI) (SAR)
Sensor Multi-Spectral Scanning Spectro
Pointable
Multi-Spectral Radar I BandScanner Radiometer Scanner
Measurement 0. 5 - 12. 6 im 0. 5 - 12. 6µm 0. 5 - 1. 111m 8.5 GHzFrequency 5 Bands 7 Bands 4 Bands Single Frequency
Swath Width 185 km 185 km 48 km 40 km
FOV, Deg. 11.5 15 +40 2
Resolution 86 µ rad 30 µ rad 14 µ rad 30 µ rad
Data Rate
Unprocessed
Processed 15 Mbps 100 Mbps 75 Mbps 2-100 Mbps
Size:
Optics 9 Inches 16 Inches 16 Inches 4.5x 0;, 8 m
Unit 0.4x0.4x1m Ix1.1x1.3m [:	 Ix1.1x1.3m NA
Average Power, W 45 55 69 1150(1)
Reliability NA 901a G 2 Yr. 9010 @ 2 Yr. 95%n @ 100 Hrs.
Stabilization Axis 3-Axis 3-Axis 3-Axis 3-Axis
Pointing:
Direction Earth Earth Earth Earth
Accuracy + 0. 7 deg. (2 ) + 0. 01 deg. + 0. 01 deg. + 0. 01 deg.
Weight:
Optics Assembly 65 kg 150 kg 150 kg 40 kg
Electronics 82 kg
Reference (3) 4.9 b 4.9 c 4.9 d 4.9 e
(1) Operates only 10 minutes per orbit,
(2) ERTS pointing requirements,
(3) Indicates reference listed in Section 4. 9. page 4-9, of this report,
y	 :	 3
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Table 4-4. Mission Equipment
Ocean Coherent Visible And
Topography Wind Field Imaging Microwave Infrared
Altimeter Scatterometer Radar Radiometer Radiometer
Mission Equipment (ALT) (SCAT) (SAR) (MWR) (VIRR)
Active Synthetic Microwave Visible andSensor Pulse Radar Fan Beam Radar Scanner InfraredScanner
Measurement 13. 6 GHz 14, 5 GHz 1.376 GHz 6. 6 - 37 GHz 0.5 - 12.51aFrequency 5 Bands 2 Bands
Swath Width 1.2 km + 49 deg. 2 - 100 km 1000 km 1900 km
FOV, Deg. 1.5 0.5 20 1.2 0.4
Resolution:
Accuracy + 0.5 m + 20 deg. 25 m + 0. 5 deg. 2 km
Area 20 km 50 km 100 km 100 km 2 km
Data Rate:
Unprocessed 7.0 Kbps 240 bps 25 Mbps 4 Kbps 12 Kbps
Processed -_0.4 Kbps 240 bps 350 Kbps' 1 Kbps 3 Kbps
Size (Optics) i - 1.Om 5 - 2, 7 m Sticks 2-4.5x2.5m ? - 1.25mOff- 12 cm MirrorParabola Dish panels. set Parabola
Average Power, W 125_ 107 184 65 25
Reliability NA NA NA NA NA
Stabilization Axis Pitch & Roll Pitch & Roll 3-Axis 3 -Axis 3-Axis
Pointing:
Direction Nadir Nadir + 200 of Nadir Nadir Nadir
Accuracy +0.75 0 + 1.0° +0.5 0 + 1.0° +0.5 
0 
Weight:
Optics Assembly 5 kg 35 kg 100 kg 50 kg 10 kg
Electronics 40 kg 40 kg 75 kg
Reference (1) 9 f 9 f 9 f 9 f 9 f
Weight
Pointing	 2
)
Average Data Coverage
Mission Equipment Accuracy( Power (W) kg (lb) Rate (bps) (deg)
UV Magnetograph 5 sec. 20 45 (99) 500 2
EUV Spectrometer 5 sec. 20 45 (99) 1000 2
X-Ray Spectrometer 5 sec. 15 45 (99) 350 5
X-Ray Imaging 10 sec. 15 45 (99) 200 5
X-Ray Polarimeter 1 sec. 10 7 (15) 400 5
Gamma Ray Detector 1 deg. 12 90 (198) 500 20
Hard X-Ray Spectrometer I deg. 12 32 (71) 500 20
Solid 'State X-Ray Detector 1 deg. 5 9 (20) 200 10
Coronagraph 2 mina 10 45 (99) 500 20
UV Spectrometer 5 sec. 20 50 (110) 500 2
Neutron Detector l deg. 15 93 (205) 200 20
H-Photometer 5 sec. 10 9 (20) 125 2
Flare Finder 10 sec. 10 14 (31) 1	 50 2
Summary 1 sec. 174 529 (1165)!	 5025(4) --
f
i
(1) Candidate payload instruments for initial SMM (see section ,4. -9, reference k).
(2) Pointing accuracy assumed equivalent to sensor alignment accuracy.
i (3) Nighttime power requirements approximately 20 percent of average power.
(4) Data rates will double during flare activity for one minute duration.
	4. 5	 PREFERRED SPACE SYSTEM APPROACH
a. Sun, synchronous inclination and altitude consistent with
ground resolution; direct CONUS communication and
low program cost.
b. Standardized spacecraft modules to accommodate land
resource management, water resource and pollution
monitoring, ocean dynamic measurement--, and weather
and climate observation. The spacecraft design should
have flexibility for missions not yet defined. The
satellite on-orbit operational control is located at
Greenbelt, Maryland for telemetry, tracking, and command
via S-band link to STDN stations. The mission equip-
ment data are transmitted to Sioux Falls, South Dakota
for direct CONUS link and lower rate data to many user
stations that are equipped with low cost ground systems
(LCGS). The basic capabilities of the LCGS are to display
image data and produce photo products.
C.
	
System should provide 70 to 80 percent on-orbit time
coverage.
d.	 Share deployment and service operation with other missions
	
Y
to reduce cost.
	
x t
i
	4.6	 COMPETING TERRESTRIAL SYSTEMS
Not to be studied.
	
4.7
	
SYSTEM BUDGET
None provided.
	
4.8	 SPECIAL PROBLEMS
a.	 Advanced state-of-the-art:
(1) Data transmission rates of 200 Mbps. Current
"space and ground equipments do not have this
capability.
(2) Airborne tape recorders of 200 Mbps,
(3) Standard. , 	 subsystem modules.
b.	 Optimize Shuttle parking orbit.
r
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In order to carry out the intent of the problem statement,
alternative
a
p
systems and satellite characteristics were defined.	 Satel-
lites were synthesized, their costs estimated, and the risks assessed
2
for each of the alternative approaches.	 The result	 of considering the
alternatives, then, was to obtain tradeoff data which was used to select
e
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the optimum or lowest cost approach. Alternative satellite characteristics
that were used in the analysis (in addition to varying the mode of operation)
were:
	
1.	 Standard and non-standard satellite subsystems
	
2:	 Satellites designed with nominally no component redundancy
(except for critical path for satellite operation which
would prevent satellite retrieval) and nominally one
level of component redundancy
	
3.	 Satellite-furnished velocity for deployment and place-
ment in final orbit. Propulsive AV capabilities of 0,
304.8, and 457.2 m/sec (0, 1000, and 1500 ft/sec)
were used. For no propulsive capability, the Shuttle
deployed the satellite in its final orbit and retrieved or
serviLed satellites in their final orbit. For propulsive
capability of 304.8 m/ sec (1000 ft/ sec), the orbiter
deployed the satellite in an elliptical orbit with perigee
of 185 km (100 nmi) and apogee at the circular altitude
of the final orbit. Retrieval or service is performed in
the same elliptical orbit. For propulsive capability of
457.2 m/sec (1500 ft/sec), the satellite was deployed
in a 296 km (160 nmi) circular orbit by the Shuttle.
Satellite retrieval or service were performed in the
same orbit.
M1
5. SATELLITE SYNTHESIS
Satellite design synthesis for the EOS system for non-standard
spacecraft is a straightforward application of the BRAVO Satellite Synthesis
Computer Program described in Reference 11. 1 (Section 11). The inputs
and outputs to the analysis are contained in the BRAVO/EOS Workbooks
on file at Aerospace Corporation. The mission equipment and its
characteristics used in the synthesis are described in the problem
statement (see previous section). The syntheses performed in July
and August of 1974 specified satellite 95 percent power down while operating
on the dark side. At the direction of NASA, the satellites were resynthesized
in late September and October 1974 to obtain 100 percent operation
(no power down) on the dark side. Although non-modular satellites
were synthesized using the BRAVO techniques, all satellites actually
analyzed for cost and logistics traffic were constructed of subsystem
modules similar to those designed for the EOS by GSFC.
The synthesis of spacecraft with standardized modules is
not currently an automated capability in the BRAVO techniques. The
steps used in building up satellite designs for the EOS satellites from
standard subsystem modules, including the selection of module size
for standardization, are described in the following paragraphs.
The first step in the procedure is to select and synthesize
non-standard but modularized spacecraft. For this analysis, the EOS-B
and the EOS-C were selected as spacecraft designs whose modules
would be good candidates for potential standardization and application
to all five missions [EOS-A, -B, -C, -D, -E, and Solar Maximum
Mission (SMM ,)]. The EOS-C was chosen because it was the heaviest
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and highest performance spacecraft, therefore, the EOS-C modules
could satisfy any of the other missions. At the same time it was recognized
that the overkill of using all EOS-C modules for sta-adardization would
be extremely large. Therefore, a lower performing, lighter spacecraft
set of modules (EOS-B) was selected which appeared to have application
to many of the missions at a lower value of overkill. Once these modular
spacecraft were. synthesized, the design weight statement was reorganized
so that the weights could be listed by module and spaceframe elements
for all the EOS-B (small) modules and for the EOS-C (large) modules.
Examples of these reorganized design weight statements are shown in
Tables 5-1 and 5-2. The tables shown are for modules designed to
obtain one level of redundancy at 100 percent power in the earth's
shadow. The EOS-C design weight statement is for a satellite sized
for a AV of 304. 8 m/sec (1000 ft/sec). The propellant for both the
propulsion module and the reaction control system is hydrazine. The
EOS-B was designed for no satellite propulsive capability. The ether
variables were the same as for the EOS-C.
T ^ next step in the process of building up satellite designs
from a standard EOS subsystem module was to select which modules
were to be standardized. For each subsystem, both the EOS-B and
EOS-C modules were considered by building up EOS-A, -B, -C, -D,
-E, and SMM from each set of modules. Then either the EOS-B module
or_EOS- C module for each specific subsystem was chosen on the basis of:
1. Feasibility
2. Number of programs to which a module is applicable
3. Minimization of overkill.
For instance, the propulsive. AV module for the EOS-C was chosen on
the basis of feasibility in that the normal mode of operation was expected
to require a AV of about 304. 8 m/sec (1000 ft/sec). The EOS-C propulsion
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Table 5-1. EOS -C-41 Design Weight Statement Organized by Module
Weight
Unit k lb
Non-Replaceable Unit (NRU)
Structure and TPS 445 (980)
Solar Arrays 84 (186)
Distribution 44 (	 97)
Power Conditioning 17 (	 38)
590 (1301)NRU Total
Guid, , Nay. , and Stab.
Structure 31 (	 68)
G. N. & Stab. 191 (421)
Elect. Dist. 48 (106)
270 (595)G. & N. SRU Total
Propulsion Module
Structure 103 (226)
,&V Motor 136 (300)
OV Propellant 545 (1201)
Rf_,S Inerts 30 (	 66)
RCS Propellant 70 (154)
Elect. Dist. 8 (	 17)
892 (1964)Propulsion SRU Tota?,
CDPI Module
Structure 31 (	 68)
CDPI 35 (	 77)
Tape Recorders 242 (533)
Wide Band Comm. 121 (266)
Elect. Dist. 100 (222)
529 (1166)CDPI Total
Electrical Module
Structure 31 ( 68)
Batteries 270 (596)
Elect. Dist. 68 (150)
369 - (814)Elect. SRU Total
Weight
kg (lb)Unit
Thematic Mapper Module
Structure 31 (	 68)
Thematic Mapper 180 (397)
Elect. Dust. 45 (100)
256 (565)Thematic Mapper Total
Pollution Monitor Module
Structure 31 (	 68)
Pollution Monitor 180 (397)
Elect. Dist. 45 (100)
Pollution Monitor Total 256 (565)
HRPI Module
Structure 31 (	 68)
HRPI 180 (397)
Elect. Dist. 45 (100)
HRPI Total 256 (565)
SAR Module
Structure 31 ( 68)
SAR 146 (322)
Elect. Dist. 37 (	 81)
SAR Total 214 (471)
Wet Weight 3632 (8006)
Adapter 123 (272)
Gross Weight 3755 (8278)_
I	 I	 ^
Table 5-2. EOS-B Design Weight Statement Organized by Module
Weight
Unit kg (lb)
Non-Replaceable Unit
Structure and TPS 108 (237)
Elect. Arrays
Distribution
25
23
(' 56)
(	 50)
Power Conditioning 11 -	 (	 25)
NRU Total 167 (368)
Guid. , Nay. , and Stab.
Structure 19 ( 42)
G. N. & Stab. 113 (248)
Elect. Dist. & Condit. 32 (	 71)
G. & N. Mod. Total 164 (361)
Propulsion. Module
Structure 19 ( 42)
Propulsion --_ ---
Apogee Motor --- ---
Apogee Propellant ---' ---
RCS Inerts 14 (	 30)
RCS Propellant _ 30 (	 67)
Elect. Dist. & Cond. 4 (	 9)
Propulsion Mod. Total 67 (148)-,
CDPI Module
Structure 19 ( 42)
CDPI 35 (	 77)
DCS 12, (	 27)
Wide Band Comm. 97 (213)
Elect. Dist. & Condit. 47 (104)
CDPI Mod. Total 210 (463)
Table 5-2. EOS-B Design Weight Statement Organized by Module (Cont'd)
Weight
Unit kg (lb)
Electrical Module
Structure 19 ( 42)
Batteries 81 (179)
Elect. Dist. & Condit. 24 (	 52)
Elect. Mod. Total 124 (273)
Thematic .Mapper Module
Structure 19 ( 42)
Thematic Mapper 179 (396)
Elect. Dist. & Condit. 52 (114)
Thematic Mapper
Mod. Total
250 (552)
HRPI Module
Structure 19 ( 42)
HRPI 179 (396)
Elect. Dist. '& Condit. 52 (114)
HRPI Module Total 250 (552)
Wet Weight -1232 (2717)
Adapter 78 (171)
Launch Weight 1310 (2888)
i
module could supply this capability for all satellites and have propellant
off-loaded for many of the applications, thus minimizing overkill.
Several missions required wideband data systems and a data recording
capability so that the EOS -C CDPI'(Communications, Data Processing
and Instrumentation) subsystem was chosen for standardization. When
not required, the system wideband data system was recovered from the
CDPI module. The EOS-C basic spaceframe was selected as a basic
or standard spaceframe. The basic spaceframe, which was common
to all six satellite designs, provided for six modules. Additional space-
frames could be added for up to a total of eleven modules (as required
for the EOS -C standardized design). The solar array is mounted directly
to the spaceframe. For standardized solar array this is acceptable
because the array is considerably oversized for all missions except
EOS-C. Therefore, the life of the solar array could be extended by
allowance for degradation in the solar cell output beyond normal tolerances.
EOS-B modules were selected for the remaining subsystems
(guidance, navigation, stability and control; electrical power; thematic
r
mapper; and high resolution pointing instrument). For guidance, navi-
gation, stability and control and electrical power, the minimum number
of modules applied to any design was one, however, several modules
were used in satellite designs requiring increased performance from
these subsystems.
Once these standardized modules were selected, the next step
in the procedure was to build up each satellite design from a standardized
	 {
module with the selected spaceframe approach and make an estimate of i
additional non-standard design weights. The total weight of each of the
standardized satellite designs can then be calculated.
5-?
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The last step in this synthesis of standardized spacecraft is to
organize the standardized satellite design data into a format suitable for
input into the cost estimating analysis. For this step, the subsystem
weights are separated for each design; for each subsystem the weights
are separated into standard and non-standard elements. The number of
modules in each design is listed along with the number of common
programs for each standard portion of satellite designs for each subsystem.
The results of this step are illustrated by the data in Table 5-3. This
example is again for the spacecraft with a propulsive AV capability of
approximately 304.8 m/sec (1000 ft/sec) and designed with one level of .
component redundancy in each of the subsystems.
The overkill resulting from this design approach is shown in
Table 5-4. With further effort, the overkill could be reduced but this
is not expected to have a large effect on the cost results.
h.
is
_	
a
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a	 Table 5-3. Design Weight Statement Organized for Cost
Estimating EOS Spacecraft, Build Up From
Standard Modules
to
^O
SPACECRAFT	 --+ EOS-A EOS-B EOS-C EOS-D EOS-E SMM
NUMBER OF MODULES --+ 6 6 11 8 6 5
WEIGHT-+
UNIT kg (lb) kg (lb) kg (lb) kg (lb) kg (lb) kg (1b)
Standard NRU 432 (	 951) 432 (	 951) 506 (1115) 506 (1115) 432 ( 951) 432 (	 951)
Standard Solar Array 84 (	 186) 84 (	 186) 84 (	 186) 84 (	 186) 84 (	 186) 84 (	 186)
Standard Adapter 123 ( 272) 123 (	 272) 123 ( 272) 123 ( 272) 123 ( 272) 123 272)
(1409) (1573)Subtotal 639 639 (1409) 713 (1573) 713 639 (1409) 639 (1409)
Standard CDPI 287 (	 633) 288 ( 633) 530 (1166) 407 ( 900) 347 (	 766) 167 ( 367)
Standard GNS&C 164 (	 361) 164 (	 361) 328 (	 722) 164 (	 361) 164 (	 361) 651 (1435)(
Standard Electrical 124 ( 273) 124 ( Z73) 495 (1092) 248 (	 546) 248 ( 546) 124 ( 273)
Standard HRPL --- ---- 250 ( 552) 250 ( 552) ---
Standard Thematic Mapper 250 (	 552) 250 ( 552) 250 ( 552)
Polution Monitor (Non-Std.) --- ---- --- ---- 250 (	 552) --- ---- --- ---- --- ----
Add M.E. (Non-Standard) 78 (	 173) --- ---- 146 (	 322) 432 { 953) 435 (	 960) 631 (1392)
Non-Std. Module Structure 16 (	 35) --- ---- 29 (	 64) 87 (	 191) 87 (	 192) 126 ( 278)
Non-Std. Electrical 23 (	 50) --- ---- 42 (	 93) 125 ( 275) 126 ( 277) 182 (	 401)
Extra NRU Structure --- ---- --- ---- 112 ( 246) --- ---- --- ---- -	 --- ----
(2077)Subtotai 942 1076	 f (2371) 2432 (5361)	 1 1463 (3226) 1407 1	 (3102) 1881 (4146)
Propulsion Module
Std. Orb. Adjust Dry 232 (	 511) 232 (	 511) 232 (	 511) 232 (	 511) 232 (	 511) 232 (	 511)
Std. RCS Dry 44 (_ 98) 44 (	 98) 44 (	 98) 44 (	 98 ) 44 (	 9 8 ) 44 (	 98)
Total Dry Weight _ 1857 (4095) 1991 (4389) 3421 (7543) 2452 (5408) 2322 (5120) 2796 (6164)
Orb. Adj. Propell.
(1000 fps) 312
( 688) 334 (	 737) 545 (1201) 412 (	 908) 390 (	 860) 470 (1035)
RCS Propellant 48 (	 105) 50 (	 111) 70 (	 154) 59 (	 130) 57 ( 125) 65 (	 144)
Launch Weight 2217	 1 (4888 ) 2375 (5237) 4036 (8898) 2923 (6446) 2769	 1 (6105) 3331 (7343)
(1) Remove tape recorders.
(2) - Remove entire wideband data system.
(3) Non-standard (two modules).
Table 5-4. Effects of Standardization on Satellite Weight and Availability
Satellite Design with Redundant Components Operated In An
Orbital Resupply Mode, Typical Result
To Increase Satellite System Availability
Satellite In Satellite Weight
Non-Standard StandardProject Due to Standardization(Overkill)
EOS -B 37 0.92 0.92
EOS -C 7 0.92 0.90
EOS-D 43 0.83 1	 0.83
EOS -E 56 0.84 0.84
t F
1
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b. SATELLITE ACCOMMODATION
With the current performance of the Space Shuttle and each
satellite having a propulsive AV of 304. 8 m/sec (1000 ft/sec), the
performance required of the Space Shuttle ,never exceeded its capability.
The Space Shuttle deployed, retrieved, or serviced the EOS satellites
in an elliptical orbit with 185 km (100 nmi) perigee and apogee corres-
ponding to the final circular orbit altitude into which the satellite deployed
itself. In the accommodation analysis, the satellite weight load factors
were calculated for each type of flight and the costs of the user charged
for transportation according to the assumptions and charge formulas
shown in Table 6-1. Transportation charges were included for satellite
support and adapters. For on-orbit resupply, transportation charges
were also made for the flight support system accomplishing the module
E
 ,.. r.,, 	 x.r,	 af. >K , ..., ii .rtr	 w F —t,+t . 	 .Fa	 ..	 ,	 -.
Table 6-1. EOS Transportation Charges
• ASSUMPTIONS
J $10.97M PER SHUTTLE FLIGHT DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN UP AND DOWN
FLIGHTS
/	 UP FLIGHTS ARE SHARED
0 CHARGE PROPORTIONAL TO WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR
• FULL CHARGE FOR 0. 6 WEIGHT FACTOR
a, 	 DOWN FLIGHTS ARE NOT SHAREDN;
/ FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM WEIGHT CHARGED TO PAYLOAD ON SATELLITE
?	 DEPLOYMENT FLIGHTS
/ MODULE EXCHANGE MECHANISM WEIGHT PLUS FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM
WEIGHT CHARGED TO PAYLOAD ON SERVICE FLIGHTS
• CHARGE FORMULAS:
SATELLITE DEPLOYMENT CHARGE:
Satellite Wt + FSS Wt	 1'	 $10.9 7M
Shuttle apa i ity x ^- x --- -- = Up Flight Charge
UP SERVICE CHARGE:
(Module Wt x No. of Modules) + Prop. Module Wt + MEM Wt + FSS Wt 
x 
1 x $10.97M _ Up Flight
6-7Shuttle Capability 	 ^	 2	 - Charge
7. SYSTEM COSTING
a
System cost estimates for DDT&E, unit costs, and operating
costs were made by application of the BRAVO cost estimating capability
(see Reference 11. 1, Section 11). The outputs of the cost estimatesi
utilizing the computer program are tabulated in the BRAVO/EOS Work-
books on file at Aerospace Corporation.
8. RISK AND LOGISTICS ANALYSIS
Please refer to the section on Definition of Terms (Section 2)
for definitions of the three logistics modes studied for this report.
The assumptions used in the risk and logistics analysis are:
	
1.	 Each satellite module for one satellite is treated as an
average quantity; that is, each module has average
reliability characteristics, average module costs for
refurbishment, and average module weight for transportation.
	
2.	 When component wearout is expected for any component
within a module, one of the following actions is taken:
(a) For the space resupply mode of operation, the
module subject to wearout is replaced on orbit,
returned, and refurbished on the ground.
(b) For the ground refurbishment mode, the satellite
is replaced on orbit by one of the ground spare
satellites.
(c) For the expend mode, the satellite is replaced by
a new satellite.
	
3.	 For the space resupply mode, when component wearout
is anticipated on the nom-replaceable unit (NRU), the
component is replaced during NRU refurbishment when
the satellite is returned to the ground because of a failure
within the NRU.
	
4.	 Where component wearout is encountered in mission
equipment and tape recorders at four years.
	
5.	 The following logistic parameters were used as baseline
values in the analysis. The value changes from the base-
line only when sensitivity analyses are run.
(a) Satellite refurbishment time is six months.
(b) Satellite module cost is 39 percent of the unit
cost
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(c) Shuttle/F.,OS operations occur in the 1982 throt
1990 time frame. The analysis using the STS
assumes the Shuttle to be available at W TR in
1982. The analysis ends arbitrarily in 1990.
(d) The delay time between satellite failure callin
the Shuttle launch and the actual satellite replz
ment or module replacement is two months.
(e) Payload transportation costs are shared with c
payload programs.
(f) Payload transportation reliability is 0. 907 for
spacecraft with propulsive AV and 0. 935 for sl
craft with no propulsive AV. Transportation
reliability measures the rate of success for pl
the payload in final orbit and operating it with(
encountering satellite infant mortality. The s;
infant mortality rate is six percent. The Shun
abort rate is assumed to be 1/2 percent and the
spacecraft ,&V abort rate is three percent.
(g) The number of spares required on the ground for
each mission which has two satellites on orbit is
shown in Table 8-1. For each mission with one
satellite on orbit, one spare satellite was assumed
as a ground spare.
The detailed printouts from the Risk and Logistics Computer
Program Analysis are in the BRAVO /EOS Workbooks on file at Aerospace
Corporation. The findings of these analyses and top-level numerical
results are presented and discussed in the next section on economic
analysis and study findings.
• NU'M'BER OF SPARES REQU I RED ON THE GROUND FOR EACH M I SS I ON
WHICH HAS TWO SAELLITES ON ORBIT
w
Mode Satellite Component Redundancy Level
Of
Operation None One Level
Ground Refurbish 2 Satellites 1 Satellite
1 Satellite
On-Orbit Resupply + 1 Satellite
1 Set of Modules
9. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND STUDY FINDINGS
In this study, initial tradeoffs were accomplished in the study
period through October 1974. The numerical results of these initial
tradeoffs analyses are contained in the BRAVO/EOS Workbooks on file
at Aerospace Corporation. The findings were:
1. Satellite propulsion capability tradeoffs - The satellites
were designed with propulsive capability for 0,; 304. 8,
and 457.2 m/sec (0, 1000, and 1500 ft /sec). For the
satellites with propulsive AV capability, the Shuttle
deployed, retrieved, or _serviced the satellite in lower
energy orbits. The addition of propulsion to the satel-
1; te increased the satellite costs but decreased the
transportation charges. The net effect made little
difference in the system costs for the same mode of
operation. Space resupply is the lowest cost mode of
operation independent of satellite propulsive capability.
2. In order to be compatible with the Delta launch vehicle,
for the EOS-A and EOS-B satellite designs satellite self- 	 a
propulsion could not be used because of the payload weight
performance capability of the Delta. However, this
made the design incompatible with the Titan launch
performance when the Titan launch vehicle had no upper
stage. The Delta launch vehicle weight constraint had 	 a
no margin available for satellite component redundancy.
3. The compromise design approach selected for further 	 d
study used the satellite: propulsion capability of 304. 8
m/sec (1000 ft/sec) because of the compatibility with
Titan and therefore all missions in the mission model.
Payload deployment and rendezvous occur in an elliptical
orbit with the Shuttle.
	 1
4. The results of the component comparison of the modes
of operation with no satellite component redundancy
for the EOS-B satellite system are shown in Table 9-1.
It is shown that space resupply lowers the system costs 	 s
significantly, first because of fewer launches over the
nine -year operating period, and second because there is
less satellite hardware refurbished.
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Table 9-1. Comparison of EOS-B Satellite System Modes of Operation
STS Supported, No Satellite Component Redundancy
l
N
Cost To
_	 Number Establish and Operate
Satellite System	 - Of Relative To
Operational Mode Availability Satellite Launches Expendable Mode
Expendable 0.75 18.1 1.00
Ground Refurbishable 0.75 18.1 0.60
Space Serviceable 0.78 14.3 0.43
• SPACE SERVICING CAN LOWER THE SYSTEM COSTS SIGNIFICANTLY
I	 FEWER LAUNCHES IN NINE-YEAR PERIOD
1	 LESS HARDWARE REFURBISHED
f5.	 The. tradeoff for component redundancy level on the
satellite designs compared satellites with no component
redundancy, one level of component redundancy, and two
levels of component redundancy. All satellite designs
had either backup capability or sufficient reliability to
avoid single path failures in areas critical to satellite
recovery. The results of the tradeoffs that used one
level of component redundancy reduced system costs
significantly since the transportation cost reduction
exceeded the increased satellite DDT&E and unit costs.
For two levels of component redundancy, the system costs
increased over one level of redundancy since the satellite
cost increases exceeded the transportation cost savings.
Therefore, the one level of component redundancy approach
was selected for standardized EOS module design iri the
succeeding effort.
Based on the initial findings described above, many of the
alternative design concepts were eliminated. For the remainder of
the study, the analysis concentrated on satellite designs with one level
of component redundancy and a satellite propulsive AV capability of
304. 8 m/sec (1000 ft/sec). The issues remaining to be investigated 	 33
were the influence of satellite subsystem standardization on the preferred
mode of operation, the estimation of the cost savings available for the
EOS programs with the optimum design approach, and. the sensitivity
of the study results to assumptions and system parameters.
The study of the influence of standardization was approached
assuming that the maximum benefits would be obtained from standardiza-
tion by assuming  single congnizant office using the same contractor
set up for development and manufacture of all satellite configurations
in a manner similar to the current launch vehicle systems. It was
assumed that five programs (EOS-B, -C -D, -E, and SMM) would
share the DDT&E costs for all standardized spacecraft modules and
elements for the standardized spaceframe. The standardization philosophy
provided for standard modules, each containing exactly the same hardware
9-3
3
i
I;
with the exception that hardware could be removed if not needed for a
specific application (e. g. tape recorders). The designs resulting
from the application of this stabilization approach resulted in standardized
spacecraft weights which were substantially larger than the custom
design satellites. This overkill is shown in Table 5-4 (Sec. 5) for the EOS
satellites. The system availability estimated for non-standard and
standard satellite systems is also shown in Table 5-4. The influence
of standardization on system availability is small.
The findings resulting from the analysis of standard and non-
standard spacecraft for EOS are:
1.	 The percent savings due to standardization are shown
in Table 9-2. Even though it costs more to develop
the standardized spacecraft modules originally, the
savings to each individual program are substantial,
varying from 34 to 56 percent.
Z.	 For the standardized satellites, substantial savings are
shown for space resupply on each project relative to 	 !	 d
ground refurbishment or the expendable mode of operation
(see Table 9-3). The EOS-B system saves by reducing
the transportation costs with fewer flightsand a reduction
in satellite hardware costs. For space resupply less
satellite hardware is refurbished than for ground refur-
bishment. Ground refurbishment saves relative to the
expendable mode of operation by a reduction of investment
in new satellite units. For EOS-C, -D, and -E, there
is not a meaningful reduction in satellite transportation
costs with space resupply. All of the savings are a result
of reduced satellite hardware costs. A breakdown of the
cost comparisons into satellite system cost categories 	 1
is shown in Table 9-4.
3.	 The savings with non-standard satellites is very similar
to the savings with standard satellites for the space'
resupply mode of operation (see Table 9-5).
1
a
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Table 9-2. Effects of Standardization on Cost, Satellite Design With
Redundant Components Operating In An Orbital Resupply
Mode, Typical Result
Ln
Satellite
Project
_% Savings
	
_
Due To Standardization
DDT&E Cost
% Savings_
Due To Standardization
Peak Annual Costs
EROS 50 45(EOS -A, B)
EOS -C 54 65
EOS -D 36 33
EOS -E 36 38
Table 9-3. Comparison of Satellite System Modes of Operation
STS Supported, Standardized Satellites With Redundant
Components
Satellite Number Cost To Establish &
Satellite Operational System Of Operate Relative To,
Project Mode Availability Satellite Launches Expendable Mode
Expend 0.90 9.4 1.00
EOS -B Ground Refurb. 0.86 9.3 0.76
S ace Resupply_ 0.92 6.6 0.57
Expend 0.92 5.7 1.00
EOS -C Ground Refurb. 0.90 5.6 0.74
S	 e Resupply 0.90 6.5 0.65
Expend 0.86 10.7 1.00
EOS -D G ro u nd Ref u rb. 0.79 10.4 0.71
Space Resupply 0.83 10.8 0.63
Expe nd 0.88 10.0 1.00
EOS --E Ground Refurb. 0.85 9.9 0.83
Space Resupply 0.84 11.0 0.63
Inve s t- Mainte -
Satellite Operational Mode DDT&E ment Transport nance Operations Total
Ground Refurb. 58 101 60 92 20 _ 331
EOS-B Space Resupply 58 101 38 49 14 260
Gr. Ref. - Sp. Resup. 0 0 22 43 6 71
Ground Refurb. 93 126 39 110 20 388
EOS -C Space Resupplyp	  y 93 126 53 58 23 353
Gr. Ref. - Sp. Resup. 0 0 -14 52 -3 35
Ground Refurb. 104 132 84 140 27 487
EOS-D Space Resupply- 104 132 80 98 Z8 442
Gr. Ref. - Sp. Resup. 0 0 4 42 -1 45
Ground Refurb. 91 158 74 118 24 465
EOS-E Space Resupply 91 158 82 58 25 414
Gr. Ref. - Sp. Resup. 0 0 -8 60
-1
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Table 9-5. Comparison of Satellite System Modes of Operation 	 ~
STS Supported, Non-Standard Satellites With Redundant
Components
Satellite Number Cost To Establish &
Satellite Operational System Of Operate Relative To
Project Mode Availability Satellite Launches Expendable Mode
Expend 0.90 9.4 1.00
EOS -B Ground Ref u rb. 0.86 9.3 0.74
Space Resupply 0.92 6.6 0.54
Expend 0.92 5.2 1.00
EOS-C Ground Refurb. 0.93 5.1 0.77
Space Resupply 0.92 5.6 0.60
Expend 0.86 10.7 1.00
EOS -D Ground Refurb. 0.79 10.4 0.71
Space Resupply 0.83 10.8 0.64
Expend 0.88 10.0 1.00
EOS-E Ground Refurb. 0.85 9.9 0.74
Space Resupply 0.84 11.0 0.60
tt
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The crossover point where a space resupply cost savings
disappears would be where a satellite unit cost is less
than half the $30M EOS-B unit cost (see Figure 9-1).
The space resupply mode of operation is less expensive
than either of the other modes independent of the satellite
repair costs (see Figure 9-2). The savings for space
resupply relative to expending satellites is less for the
higher repair, costs. For the ground refurbishment
mode, it costs more to operate with refurbishment
than to expend satellites on orbit if the average repair
cost is 70 percent or more than the average procurement
cost for 'a satellite unit. This results from transportation
charges for satellite return exceeding the benefits of
reduced satellite hardware costs through refurbishment.
Satellite replacement delay has a large influence on system
availability (see Figure 9-3). It will be important to keep
the satellite replacement delay time under four months
to obtain availabilities of 80 percent with the EOS system.
Another satellite characteristic having a large influence
on availability is the failure rate (see Figure 9-4). As
the satellite failure rate goes up, not only do the system
costs increase for all three modes of operation, but also
the number of flights required for logistics increases
(although at a lesser rate for the refurbishment mode of
operation).
It is expected that the number of satellite flights for the
	 j
space resupply mode of operation could be further
reduced by designing the satellites with less equipment
attached to the non-replaceable unit. For instance,
future studies should consider the potential benefits
of making the solar array unit replaceable on orbit and.
making as many of the mission equipment units subject
to on-orbit removal and replacement as possible. This
would reduce the number of non-replaceable unit failures
in the operating life of the system and, therefore, the
logistic transportation costs. 	 i
a
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Figure 9-1. Effect of Satellite Unit Cost on Space Resupply Benefits For
STS Supported EOS-B Standardized Satellite Design with
Redundant Components
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Figure 9-2. Effect of Satellite Repair Cost on Space Resupply Benefits For
STS Supported EOS-B Standardized Satellite Design With
Redundant Components
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JFigure 9-3. Effect of Launch Delay on System Availability
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Figure 9-4. Effect of Satellite Failure Rate on Space Resupply Benefits
For STS Supported EOS-B
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Major findings for the EOS system resulting from this analysis
are:
1. Space resupply significantly reduces costs to establish
and operate over expending or ground refurbishing
satellites. For the STS-supported standardized EOS-B
the cost reduction is 23 percent over ground refurbish-
ment and 43 percent over expending satellites.
2. Standardization of EOS-A, -B, -C, -D, -E, and SMM
satellites (with common procurement and integration)
significantly reduces DDT&E costs. For the EOS-A,
-B, -C, -D, and -E projects, cost savings were 36 to
54 percent.
i10. ADDITIONAL EFFORT
It is recommended that additional studies investigate the
following:
1. The sensitivity of study results to transportation costs
2. The effect of EOS mission model changes on study results
3. The effect of low-cost design approach by applying low-
cost design principals to the EOS satellites and applying
the Aerospace cost/performance model to further opti-
nzize satellite designs.
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